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A THEORY OF INSURANCE POLICY
INTERPRETATION
Kenneth S. Abraham*
The first principle of insurance law is captured by the maxim con
tra proferentem, which directs that ambiguities in a contract be inter
preted "against the drafter,"1 who is almost always the insurer.2 Yet
given the modern recognition that language is an inherently imperfect
instrument for communicating meaning, insurance policy provisions are
in a sense always ambiguous. Moreover, in addition to contra profer-

* Class of 1962 Professor of Law and John V. Ray Research Professor, University
of Virginia School of Law. A.B. 1967, Indiana University; J.D. 1971, Yale.
Ed. I am
grateful to participants in workshops at the Law Schools of Indiana University (Bloom
ington), the University of Michigan, and the University of Virginia for helpful com
ments on an earlier version of this article. In the interest of full disclosure, it should be
noted that on occasion I have served as a consultant to attorneys representing policy
holders in insurance coverage disputes.
1. See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 38-47 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW]; 3
ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 559 (1960 & Supp. 1996); E. All.AN
FARNSW ORTH, CONTRACTS 518-19 (2d ed. 1990); ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDER
STANDING INSURANCE LAw§ 25C, at 105 (1987); ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN l
WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW§ 6.3(a)(2) (Practitioner's ed. 1988); JEFFREY w. STEM
PEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR IN
SURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS§ 5.2, at 180-81 (1994).
2. In fact, insurance policie� are so commonly drafted by insurance companies that
the principle is routinely transformed into a rule that ambiguities in an insurance policy
are to be interpreted in favor of coverage. See KEET ON & Wm1ss, supra note 1,
§ 6.3(a)(2), at 630 n.6 (" '[W]here semantically possible the policy will be construed to
achieve its manifest objective of indemnifying the insured against the type of losses to
which the policy relates.' " (quoting Spaid v. Cal-Western States Life Ins. Co., 182 Cal.
Rptr. 3, 5 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982))); James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Sub
ject to Special Rules of Interpretation?: Text Versus Context, 24 Aruz. ST. LJ. 995,
1003 (1992) ("[T]o the general rule that the contract should be construed as a whole
. . . we add the insurance rule that 'where two interpretations equally fair may be
made, that which affords the greatest measure of protection to the insured will pre
vail.' " (quoting Maxon v. Security Ins. Co., 29 Cal. Rptr. 586, 590 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963))); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Interpretations of Contract Disputes: Toward a
Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 51 Omo ST. LJ. 543, 567 (1996); Stephen J. Ware,
A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1461, 1464-65
(1989) ("Virtually all courts follow this rule and construe ambiguities in an insurance
contract against the insurer, in favor of coverage."); see also STEMPEL, supra note l,
§ 5.2, at 184 (noting that the goal of risk spreading weighs in favor of finding coverage
"absent clear language to the contrary" when invoking contra proferentem).
-
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entem, policyholders may invoke such allied doctrines as waiver, estop
pel, and the rule that the reasonable expectations of the insured should
be honored even if those expectations are unambiguously contradicted
by fine-print provisions in the policy.3 Contra proferentem and these
other doctrines are so frequently invoked by the courts in insurance
cases4 that the casual observer might well suppose that the true first
principle of insurance law is that insurance disputes are generally re
solved in favor of coverage. Indeed, in light of all these pro-coverage
legal doctrines, it is surprising that insurers ever win disputes involving
the meaning of policy provisions.
But of course insurers very often win coverage disputes, including
those in which a policy provision is allegedly ambiguous. Contra
proferentem is not merely a label for pro-coverage results reached for
other reasons. Rather, the process of interpreting insurance policies can
not be adequately understood without recognizing the way in which

contra proferentem helps to explain decisions both for and against poli
cyholders. Similarly, by their own terms the doctrines of waiver and es
toppel and the expectations principle have nothing to do with "interpre
tation" as it is normally understood. These doctrines direct that under
specific circumstances the meaning of even clear policy language must
be disregarded, not interpreted. But there remains a vague sense on the
part of many observers of insurance law that these doctrines, which cre
ate rights "at variance" with policy provisions,5 nevertheless have
something to do with interpretation, though precisely what has always
been difficult to articulate.
In this article I analyze and explain how the courts actually employ

contra proferentem and its allied doctrines in interpreting insurance pol
icies by uncovering the factors that I believe most influence the process
of interpretation. This effort exposes some of the diffic;ulties that the
courts have encountered in employing contra proferentem as the doc
trine has evolved. I suggest, further, that the rise of the allied doctrines
creating rights at variance with policy provisions at least in part reflects
0

the courts' effort to grapple directly with the problems that they have
been able to address only incompletely and indirectly under the rubric
of contra proferentem. So conceived the allied doctrines are not, strictly

3. See KEETON & Wmrss. supra note 1, §§ 6. l(a) -(b), at 6 1 4-21.
4. To make a rough estimate of just how frequently contra proferentem alone i s in
voked, I performed a Westlaw search within the "Insurance" topic, in the state database
alone, for opinions containing the term "ambig!" in the same paragraph as "policy" or
"language" or "provision" or "provisions." The search disclosed 4416 opinions con
taining this language decided between 1980 and 1995.
5. See KEETON & Wmrss, supra note l, §§ 6.l(a)-(b), at 61 4-15 .
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speaking, a feature of the interpretive process, but a consequence of that
process.
To summarize my argument briefly, I contend that the mislead
ingly simple notion that ambiguous policy provisions should be inter
preted in favor of coverage is comprised of two separate features: the
linguistic standard against which the ambiguity of the disputed policy
provision is judged, and the strength of policyholders' demand for the
coverage that would be afforded by a pro-coverage interpretation of the
policy provision in question. To complicate matters further, there are
two ways to employ each of these two separate features. Consequently,
what I call the "traditional" conception of contra proferentem is just
one of four possible approaches to the interpretation of an arguably am
biguous policy provision. Although the courts typically talk as if they
are applying the traditional conception, in fact they sometimes apply
one of the other three.
Although my effort to understand how contra proferentem works is
largely descriptive, it also has a nonnative component. The nonnative
implication of my analysis is that courts are likely to get themselves
into a variety of difficulties when they depart from the traditional con
ception of contra proferentem. Therefore, courts probably would do
well to get back to basics and put out of the way many of the compli
cated considerations that have implicitly influenced their interpretation
of insurance policies. At the same time, courts determined to depart
from the traditional conception should be more candid about the scope
and limits of their dep�es. I suggest a number of ways in which
such courts could make their approaches more open and workable.
I.

THE Pu!u>OSE OF

CONTRA PROFERENTEM

To understand what the courts are actually doing when they inter
pret ambiguous policy provisions, it is useful to first consider the nor
mative basis of the doctrine. After identifying the purpose (or purposes)
of contra proferentem, we can then attempt to analyze the manner in
which the doctrine functions.
Why might the law require that ambiguous insurance policy provi
sions be interpreted in favor of coverage? T he justification that the
courts typically offer is that the drafter of an ambiguous policy provi
sion should bear responsibility for ambiguity because the drafter has
control over the language used in the policy.6 The notion of control as
the basis for responsibility, however, is itself ambiguous. On the one

6. See, e.g., Vargas v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 841 (2d C ir. 1981).
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hand, the notion may imply that ambiguous policy provisions are the re
sult of faulty behavior by the insurer and that contra proferentem im
poses something like liability for negligent drafting. On this view, con

tra

proferentem

imposes

liability

on

insurers

for

employing

unreasonably unclear policy provisions - provisions which do not have
an optimal degree of clarity.7
On the other hand, the notion of control as the courts use it in their
justifications for contra proferentem may imply responsibility without
necessarily implying fault. This understanding of the connection be
tween control and responsibility makes contra proferentem more closely
resemble a version of strict liability. Like strict liability generally, im
posing liability on insurers for including ambiguous provisions in their
policies whether or not such provisions are unreasonably unclear might
serve purposes that include, but extend beyond, those served by impos
ing liability only for unreasonably unclear policy provisions. For exam
ple, because of the difficulty and cost of determining the optimal degree
of clarity in policy provisions, a strict liability standard may be superior
to negligence in terms of both cost and accuracy. Furthermore, it seems
likely that insurers in general rather than policyholders will be better
bearers of the cost of the irreducible component of ambiguity that re
mains after optimal clarity is achieved.8
Whether the notion that control warrants responsibility is under
stood as negligence or as strict liability, however, there is missing from
this bare notion a connection between the "breach" of employing an
ambiguous policy provision and the harm that results from that breach.
There are a number of possible connections. In contra<?t-law terms, the
application of contra proferentem to an ambiguous policy provision

might be understood as the awarding of expectation damages for breach
of the "promise" of coverage afforded by the ambiguous provision.9

7. Technically speaking, the optimal degree of clarity would minimize the sum of
maldrafting costs plus maldrafting avoidance costs. Maldrafting costs consist primarily
of the losses resulting from reliance by policyholders on the "false" promise of cover
age afforded by ambiguous policy provisions. Maldrafting avoidance costs consist pri
marily of the drafting costs necessary to reduce or eliminate ambiguities.
8. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 107 (4th ed. 1992)
(noting that contra proferentem assures policyholders that they have coverage if they
misinterpret an ambiguous policy provision).
9. One might also understand the invocation of contra proferentem as ordering
specific performance. Like expectation damages, specific performance is intended to
compensate the expectation interest of the promisee. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Per
due, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 54 (1936)
(arguing that both specific performance and expectation damages protect the expectation
interest by seeking to "put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have occupied
had the defendant performed his promise"); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Per-

December 1996)

Insurance

535

This answer highlights the distinction between expectation and reliance
damages. Why interpret an ambiguous policy provision against the
drafter unless the policyholder would have behaved differently had he
known that the loss in question was not insured? The same issue can be
expressed in tort-law terms as a question of causation: Why is the poli
cyholder not required to show that the coverage claimed could have
(perhaps even would have) been purchased elsewhere?
In contract law, the generic answer to this kind of question is that
reliance is often difficult and costly to prove,10 and that promisees are
systematically

undercompensated for

the

losses

they

suffer

from

breaches by promisors.11 To encourage reliance, contract law typically
dispenses with the requirement that it be proved. The same might be
true of reliance by policyholders on the "promise" of coverage afforded
by ambiguous policy provisions. If policyholders generally rely on these
kinds of promises, it may be sensible to dispense with the requirement
that reliance be proved - especially if such proof would be difficult
and expensive.
In tort law similar answers are given when proof of causation is
not required, though the causation requirement is relaxed much less fre-

formance, 89 YALE LJ. 271, 272 (1979) (noting that specific performance is ordered
when damages are inadequate to protect the expectation interest).Of course in the in
surance context the two remedies are not merely equivalent - they are identical.
10. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 9, at 60 (noting, in reference to the reliance
interest in foregone opportunities, that "the impossibility of subjecting this type of reli
ance to any kind of measurement may justify a categorical rule granting the value of the
expectancy as the most effective way of compensating for such losses "); Michael B.
Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1755,
1761; Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law Schools'
Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REv. 247, 249-50; W. David Slawson, The Role of Reliance in
Contract Damages, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 197, 220-22 (1990).
11. See George M.Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv.
1225, 1249-50 (1994) ("Both advocates and critics of the reliance measure have pointed
to the fact that the expenditure measure courts most often use when awarding reliance
damages only imperfectly compensates the promisee's 'reliance interest' because lost
opportunities are not included .... "); Slawson, supra note 10, at 219 ("Even by their
own measure, reliance damages undercompensate in practice ....[The plaintiff] is ac
tually compensated only for his out-of-pocket expenses and receives nothing for his lost
opportunities.").
Even expectation damages frequently do not achieve the compensation goal. See
Macaulay, supra note 10, at 250 ("[R]equiring damages to be foreseeable and proved
with reasonable certainty means that courts often will not protect all of a person's rea
sonable expectations."); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 274-78 (arguing that all contract
damages are so often undercompensatory that the availability of specific performance
should be greatly expanded).For a criticism of this concern with undercompensation,
see Cohen, supra, at 1310-11 (arguing that "damages are undercompensatory when un
dercompensation is necessary to provide the parties with better incentives to take pre
cautions or to mitigate; that is, compensation is an incidental concern").
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quently than its contract analogue, reliance. When proof of individual

causation is expensive and difficult, but it is clear that the defendant

harmed an indeterminate group of victims, individual proof sometimes

is not required.12 Moreover, when the defendant is more likely to have

access to evidence that could disprove causation than the plaintiff is to

have access to evidence that could prove causation, the burden of proof
m11y be shifted.13 And it is increasingly recognized in tort-law theory

that proof of causation, far from being a moral or logical imperative, is

just one simple and useful way of adding up the costs that a system de

signed to promote optimal deterrence of loss should take into account in

deciding when to impose liability.14 The analo

to contra proferentem
�
is that ambiguous policy provisions often harm policyholders even

when pinpointing how is difficult. Requiring proof of causation there

fore could be both expensive and counterproductive - if the losses of
policyholders who would be denied coverage because they relied on

ambiguous provisions but could not prove reliance would exceed the

gains of those who at present receive coverage under contra profer

entem even though they did not rely. By further analogy to tort law, it

might follow that, when insurers have it within their power to disprove

causation, they should be allowed to escape liability by doing so perhaps by showing that the policyholder claiming coverage did not

rely on the ambiguous provision.

12. See, e.g., Michie v. Great Lakes Steel Div., 495 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir. 1974)
(finding that when a plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to prove the portion of a
single hann caused by each independent tortfeasor, defendants will be held jointly and
severally liable unless a defendant can prove the portion of hann for which it is respon
sible); Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980) (holding that when a plaintiff
could not identify the individual manufacturer of the DES that caused her injury, each
individual defendant would be liable for a share of the judgment proportional to its mar
ket share unless it could disprove causation).
13. See Michie, 495 F.2d at 218; Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d l, 4 (Cal. 1948);
Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944). In Summers v. 'lice, the court held
that when two defendants acted negligently and the act of one caused the plaintiff hann,
each defendant bore the burden of disproving causation, and in the absence of such
proof they were jointly and severally liable:
When we consider the relative position of the parties and the results that would
flow if plaintiff was required to pin the injury on one of the defendants only, a
requirement that the burden of proof on that subject be shifted to defendants be
comes manifest.
Ordinarily defendants are in a far better position to offer evi
dence to determine which one caused the injury.
Summers, 199 P.2d at 4.
14. See Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for
Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69, 85 (1975); Steven Shaven, An Analysis of
Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 46566 (1980).
.

.

•
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This analysis provides plausible but empirically speculative justifi
cations for contra proferentem. The question is whether (and if so, to
what extent) the courts have employed contra proferen tem in accor
dance with these justifications. In Parts II and III, I describe the factors
that have influenced decisions in which con tra proferentem is invoked
and attempt to show the ways in which these factors are and are not
congruent with the normative case for contra proferentem. In Part IV, I
explain the way in which the allied doctrines of waiver, estoppel; and
the reasonable expectations principle mesh with this analysis. Finally, in
Part V, I explore the difficulties that would be faced by courts should
they candidly and explicitly depart from the traditional conception of

contra proferen tem, and examine several devices that the courts might
employ to cabin these departures.
II.

THE Two DIMENSIONS OF CONTRA PROFERENTEM

Because so much turns on whether a disputed policy provision is
ambiguous, the first step in understanding insurance policy interpreta
tion must be to discover the standards employed in assessing ambiguity.
In _my view the ambiguity decision seems so result-oriented to casual
observers primarily because this decision involves two different and in
frequently expressed dimensions of assessment. Moreover, not only do
different courts subscribe to different standards in making these two as-·
sessments: the same courts also apply different standards from case to
case. The first dimension of assessment is what I call the "linguistic
standard of care"; the second dimension involves the degree of policy
holder demand for the coverage in question.
A.

The Linguistic Standard of Care

The first inquiry courts make to determine whether to invoke con 
tra proferen tem i n one sense involves exactly what one would expect:
scrutiny of the language of the policy provision whose meaning is at is
sue. The hornbook rule is that a policy provision is ambiguous if it is
reasonably susceptible to two meanings.15 But in fact courts do not al
ways apply this test. On some occasions, without saying so, courts take
into account an additional, slightly different factor: whether the insurer
could have feasibly made the relevant policy language unambiguous. To
distinguish between these two approaches I will use the same terms I
used in identifying the normative case for contra proferentem

-

strict

liability and negligence. These terms have the decided advantage of be-

15. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 186.
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ing almost automatically understandable to the legal reader, both in
themselves and in relation to each other. My use of these terms risks the
disadvantage, however, of carrying some undesirable baggage and im
precision along with them. Despite this risk, in what follows I use the
terms as shorthands, without necessarily intending to import into the
analysis everything that the terms have come to mean in other settings.

1.

Strict Liability: The "Ordinary Rea der" Standard

The strict liability approach to ambiguity is the principal feature of
the hornbook statement of contra proferentem, enunciated thousands of
times by courts in every jurisdiction. If a policy provision is "ambigu
ous" - reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation by the
ordinary reader of the policy - then the provision is interpreted against
the drafter and the interpretation more favorable to the insured governs,
even if the provision could not reasonably be made less ambiguous.
This strict liability standard circumvents a host of problems that would
be posed by openly embracing a negligence standard. The most promi
nent of these would be the need to admit evidence regarding the alter
native verbal formulations that might have been employed and the po
tentially numerous considerations that could reasonably have affected
the choice among them.16
A strict liability standard may have a more important advantage as
well. Suppose that the optimal standard of linguistic care were negli
gence rather than strict liability. If most ambiguous policy provisions
would be adjudged negligent anyway, then use of a strict liability stan
dard instead of a negligence standard would reduce the costs of deci
sion at a relatively low rate of divergence from the negligence standard.
The traditional conception may therefore both incur low transaction
costs and be highly cost-effective in achieving the goal of identifying
sub-optimal policy provisions.
The difficulty with the strict liability standard, however, is that it is
opaque. It provides no guidance as to the criteria to be used in deter
mining when a policy provision is or is not reasonably subject to two
interpretations. The formulation presupposes something like an "I know

16. Drawing on the work of Lon Fuller, Professor James Henderson has described
problems of this type as "polycentric," in that they "present innumerable analytical
permutations to which the parties would logically be required to address themselves."
As a consequence, "[m]eaningful participation in the [judicial] decision through formal
proofs and argument
would be impossible
Whatever the court might decide, its
decision would not deserve to be called principled." James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial
•

•

.

.

•

.

.

Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1536 (1973).
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it when I see it" or "I know what the ordinary reader would under

stand" test,17 aided perhaps by some other aged maxims of interpreta

tion.18 The difficulty of determining whether a contract provision is am

biguous simply by staring at the contract has led some courts in both
general contract_ law and in insurance law to adopt the "modern" view

that extrinsic evidence of the meaning that the parties attached to a con-

17. See, e.g., Liggans R.V. Center v. John Deere Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 567, 571
(Ala. 1991) (stating that insurance policy unambiguously distinguished between losses
due to theft and losses due to false pretenses when "theft" is read as an ordinary person
of average understanding would read the term); McGreehan v. California State Auto.
Assn., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 235, 238 (Cal. Ct App. 1991) (using the understanding of the or
dinary person in construing insurance contracts); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Willison, 885 P.2d
342, 344 (Colo. Ct App. 1994) (stating that an insurance contract must be interpreted
from the perspective of the ordinary reader); Nugget Oil, Inc. v. Universal Sec. Ins. Co.,
584 So. 2d 1068, 1070 (Fla. Dist Ct App. 1991) ("We are bound to assign to contract
provisions the meaning that would be attached to them by an ordinary person of aver
age understanding."); West Trucking Line, Inc. v. Northland Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 262,
264 (Iowa 1990) (noting that because policyholders' underinsured motorist coverage
unambiguously excluded property damage, the "policy language expressly limits the
coverage to bodily injury damages and is easily understandable to an ordinary person");
Meiners v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 645 A.2d 9, 10 (Me. 1994) (" 'A[n insurance]
policy is ambiguous if an ordinary person in the shoes of the insured would not under
stand that the policy did not cover claims such as the [one being] brought' " (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elwell, 513 A.2d 269, 271 (Me. 1986))); Sellie v. North Dakota Ins.
Guar. Assn., 494 N.W.2d 151, 157 (N.D. 1992) (holding that in a dispute between in
surer and insured a court is concerned with what the "ordinary person's understanding
of the policy would be" (quoting Sparks v. Republic Natl. Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1127,
1135 (Ariz. 1982))); P ressman v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 760 (R.I.
1990) ("[T]he terms should be read in the same sense that the insurer had reason to be
lieve would be the way they would be interpreted by the ordinary reader and
purchaser.").
18. For example, courts occasionally employ the maxim "inclusio unius est ex
clusio alterius" or "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" (the inclusion or expression
of one is the exclusion of another) to determine the meaning of ambiguous policy lan
guage. See, e.g., Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc. v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 713
F.2d 254, 258 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding that under the maxim expressio unius, the omis
sion of contractholders from a list of parties who need not consent to a contract term
amendment, together with a provision apparently granting to the insurer an absolute
right to amend, created an ambiguity in the policy); Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York v. Commander, 231 F.2d 347, 351 (4th Cir. 1956); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 283
S.E.2d 227, 230 (W.Va. 1981) ("Not only does the rule of strict construction against the
insurance company apply but the familiar rule that the specific inclusion of one subject
excludes all others is also applicable."); cf. Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New
York, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 177-78 (Cal. 1962) (en bane) (noting that the invocation of ex
pressio unius amounts to recognition of an ambiguity in the contract, but that the
maxim should not be invoked to defeat the "rule that ambiguous terms should be con
strued against the insurer because it is a legalistic concept that does not enter the under
standing of the ordinary layman); Marcolini v. Allstate Ins. Co., 278 A.2d 796, 799
(Conn. 1971) (holding the maxim expressio unius "should not be used to create an
ambiguity").
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tract term may be admitted not only after the term is determined to be
ambiguous, but also in order to prove that the term is ambiguous.19
Unfortunately, this development merely shifts the locus of uncer
tainty. In the absence of criteria for assessing the purported ambiguity
of a policy provision, extrinsic evidence may or may not aid resolution
of the issue. In cases involving negotiated contract language, proof of a
mutually "intended" meaning different from an "objective" meaning
might serve as an effective test. In such cases evidence that the parties
subjectively intended the disputed language to mean something different
from its otherwise objective, unambiguous meaning may tend to show
that the language is ambiguous. But in the insurance context, in which
standard-form policy language is virtually always at issue, there is
rarely a mutually intended "subjective" meaning, provable with extrin
sic evidence, that differs from the otherwise unambiguous "objective"
meaning of the policy language in question.20 In short, strict liability ei
ther involves an almost completely intuitive judicial judgment about the
susceptibility of disputed policy language to more than one interPreta
tion, or masks the courts' use of a different, unarticulated standard.

2.

Negligence : The Perfectibility Standard

If strict liability were always the standard employed in invoking

contra proferentem, then insurers would win far fewer cases than they
19. See, e.g., Taylor v. State Fann Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 854 P.2d 1134, 1140-41

(Ariz. 1993) (en bane); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging
Co., 442 P.2d 641, 645-46 (Cal. 1968); Fire Ins. Exch. v. Rael, 895 P.2d 1139, 1143
(Colo. Ct. App. 1995); Denny's Restaurants, Inc. v. Security Union Title Ins. Co., 859
P.2d 619, 626 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Paccar, Inc., 634
P.2d 291 (Wash. 1981)). In Pacific Gas, the court stated:
The fact that the terms . . . appear clear to a judge does not preclude the possibil
ity that the parties chose the language of the instrument to express different
terms. . . . Accordingly, rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary con
sideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties
. If the court decides, after considering this evidence, that the language of a con
tract
is 'fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpretations contended
for,' extrinsic evidence relevant to prove either of such meanings is admissible.
Pacific Gas, 442 P.2d at 645-46 (citations omitted).
20. Such problems exist in the general contract context as well. See Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interac
tions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261, 268-69
(1985). It is worth noting, however, that a number of prominent courts in recent insur
ance cases have consulted extrinsic evidence in an effort to discern the meaning of dis
puted policy provisions. See, e.g., Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P. 2d
878, 891 (Cal. 1995) (en bane) (using evidence of drafting history); Morton Intl., Inc. v.
General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 847-48 (NJ. 1993) (using evidence
of representations made in the course of effort to secure regulatory approval of a
provision).
.

•

.

.

.

•
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do. I do not believe, however, that when insurers defeat ambiguity
claims they do so because the court has capriciously decided not to in
voke contra pro feren tem . Rather, in some of the cases in which courts
employ strict liability discourse, a more limited form of liability that re
sembles a negligence standard actually guides the decisionmaking pro
cess. Because this standard remains unarticulated, its contours are not
entirely clear. But in essence the standard seems to require not only that
the policy provision at issue be susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, but also that it be feasible to perfect the policy language
sufficiently to eliminate the ambiguity.
1\vo versions of a perfectibility standard are embedd.ed in the case
law. The "hindsight" approach asks whether, at the time of the cover
age dispute, the policy provision in question could have been perfected.
For example, standard CGL (first "Comprehensive," then "Commer
cial" General Liability21) insurance policies for decades have covered
liability payable "as damages" because of bodily injury or property
damage. After CERCLA22 was enacted in

1980 and the Environmental

Protection Agency began to order cleanup of waste deposit sites pursu
ant to its authority under the statute, many of the companies that were
the recipients of cleanup orders claimed coverage under their CGL in
surance policies for the costs of cleanup. In response to such claims, in
surers argued that a policyholder incurring costs to comply with an ad
ministrative cleanup order or a judicial injunction had not been
subjected to liability payable "as damages." Often the courts held,
however, that cleanup costs incurred by policyholders in response to
such orders are covered by CGL policies because (among other things)
the phrase "as damages" is ambiguous.23 These courts considered it ir
relevant that at the time the applicable policies were sold, CERCLA had
been neither enacte4 nor anticipated. The question in these cases was
not whether the insurer could reasonably have foreseen the enactment
I

of CERCLA, but whether, with hindsight, the phrase "as damages"

21. See ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAw, supra note l, at 448.
22. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, P ub., L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
26, 33, 42, and 49 U.S.C.).
23. See, e.g., AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1278 (Cal. 1990);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Specialty Coatings Co., 535 N.E.2d 1071, 1080
(Ill. App. Ct 1989); Hazen P aper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d
576, 583 (Mass. 1990); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers lndem. Co., 457
N.W.2d 175, 179-81 (Minn. 1990); C.D. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft
& Engg. Co., 388 S.E.2d 557, 569 (N.C. 1990).
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could have been perfected so as to achieve the insurers' purported inter
pretation more clearly.24
In contrast, a "foresight" perfectibility standard looks not only to
the quality of the policy language in dispute, but also to the reasonable
ness of the insurer's failure - at the time the policy was drafted - to
perfect that language. For example, occasionally a decision invoking

contra proferentem notes how simple it would have been for the insurer
to draft a clearer provision: "Where the risk is well known and there
are terms reasonably apt and precise to describe it, the use of substan
tially less certain phraseology, upon which dictionaries and common
understanding may fairly differ, is likely to result in interpretations
favoring coverage rather than exclusion. "25 Although such reasoning
does not expressly invoke a foresight perfectibility standard, it presup
poses one. Otherwise it would be irrelevant that the risk was "known"
and that the provision in question could have been drafted more
clearly.26
Openly formulating and applying a perfectibility standard - espe
cially a foresight standard - would be a far more complex exercise
than is required under strict liability. A strict liability standard is self
applying, even if it is not self-defining. But a perfectibility standard re
quires both definition and factual application to the policy provision at
hand. On some occasions neither is difficult because the negligent draft
ing merely involves the failure of the insurer to include simple, straight
forward language. For example, in Vlastos v. Sumitom o Marine & Fire
Insurance Company,21 the court dismissed the insurers' argument that
the disputed policy provision was unambiguous in part because "the in
surers easily could have precluded doubt by the addition of one
word."28
24. This test lies about midway between strict liability and negligence in the tort
law sense. The former does not require perfectibility, as does the hindsight-perfectibility
test, but neither does the hindsight test require foresight, as does a pure negligence test.
25. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 368 F. Supp.
1098, 1118 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), ajfd., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
26. Similarly, when multiple CGL policies issued in different years potentially
cover the same loss, insurers sometimes argue that the insured can claim coverage
under only one of these policies or
if there are not only primary, but also excess pol
icies - one of these years. There is evidence in the drafting history of the 1966 revi
sion of the CGL policy, however, that insurers anticipated this issue and consciously
decided not to address it in the revised version of the policy. See Montrose Chem. Corp.
v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 891 (Cal. 1995) (en bane). The fact that the drafters
anticipated this problem would of course be highly relevant under a foresight approach,
but irrelevant under a hindsight approach.
27. 707 F.2d 775 (3d Cir. 1983).
28. 707 F.2d at 779. The policy at issue in Vlastos provided, "Warranted that the
3rd floor is occupied as (a] Janitor's residence." 707 F.2d at 776. The insurer denied
-
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Making ambiguous policy language more clear, however, is not al
ways a matter of merely adding a word or substituting a clear phrase for
a vague one. Sometimes the problem is that the issue addressed by pu
tatively ambiguous policy language is sufficiently complex, or involves
enough permutations, that a much longer and more detailed provision
would be required to improve upon the policy language that was actu
ally employed. In this situation resolving the perfectibility issue would
require a court to address the optimal length, complexity, and precision
of the policy provision in question. For example, standard liability in
surance policies impose on the insurer a duty to defend the insured
against any suit alleging a liability that would fall within coverage if
proved.29 The policies do not indicate the scope of the insurer's duty
when a complaint contains some counts alleging liability that would fall
within coverage if proved, and other counts alleging liability that would
not fall within coverage even if proved. Nor does the typical duty-to
defend provision indicate the scope of the insurer's duty when the alle
gations of the complaint against the insured, if proved, would fall
within coverage, but facts extrinsic to the complaint indicate that there
would not be coverage - for instance, because the actual, as distin
guished from the alleged, conduct of the insured falls within an exclu
sion.30 It is not surprising that when the ambiguity of policy provisions
such as those embodying the duty to defend is at issue, the courts rarely
acknowledge their use of an implicit negligence standard. Acknowl
edgement would threaten to make admissible such evidence as drafting
standards within the insurance industry, factors that were and reasona
bly should have been taken into account in fashioning the policy lan
guage at issue, alternative verbal formulations that the drafters did and

coverage of a fire loss because the evidence showed that a massage parlor occupied a
portion of the third floor along with the Janitor's residence. The court suggested that the
addition of the word "solely" between "occupied" and "as" could easily have ren
dered the provision unambiguous. See 707 F.2d at 779.
29. The standard CGL insurance policy provides:
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as
damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insur
ance applies..'.. We will have the right and duty to defend any "suit" seeking
those damages.

INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY POLICY
(1984), reprinted in ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, at 440 (emphasis
added).
30. The most common such example involves cases in which the insured is al
leged to have acted negligently (a covered liability) but in fact acted expecting or in
tending harm (for which coverage of liability is excluded).See, e.g., Montrose Chem.
Corp. v. Superior Court, 861 P.2d 1153 (Cal.1993) (en bane).
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should have considered, and the cost of the coverage afforded by those
alternative formulations.
The prospect that insurance coverage suits would be encumbered
by disputes over the significance of these sorts of evidence surely deters
courts from openly embracing a negligence standard. What the courts
have not done expressly, however, they have done by implication. In
stead of interpreting the duty-to-defend provision in favor of coverage
in every instance in which it might be read to afford this protection,
courts have constructed a complex web of rules detailing the circum
stances under which the insurer does and does not have a duty to
defend.31
Interestingly, while courts occasionally acknowledge the perfect
ibility standard when they hold that a policy provision is ambiguous,
they virtually never acknowledge their use of this standard when they
hold that a disputed policy provision is not ambiguous. In the former
situation, stating that the ambiguous policy provision could have been
perfected merely adds weight to the decision. But in the latter situation,
reference to the perfectibility standard would constitute an admission
that, in fact, not all ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted against
the drafter. The result is that, probably more often than they are willing
to admit, courts consider a disputed policy provision to be reasonably
susceptible to more than one meaning-"ambiguous" -but they rule
that the provision is unambiguous. The difficulty that observers of in
surance disputes encounter in accurately predicting when a court will
invoke contra proferentem could be reduced measurably if those ob
servers recognized that something like a perfectibility test is sometimes
applied to claims that a provision is ambiguous. This recognition, how
ever, only gets us half the way to an understanding of how contra

proferentem operates in practice.
B.

The Policyholder Deman d Stan dard

The second dimension of assessment that influences the ambiguity
decision involves the degree of policyholder demand for the coverage
that would be supplied to the policyholder by a fmding that the policy
language in question is ambiguous. As irt the case of the linguistic stan
dard of care, there are two possible approaches to evaluating the degree

31. See KENNETII s. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RisK: INSURANCE, LEGAL
THEoRY, AND PuBuc POLICY 195-203 (1986). The actual content of these rules ap
pears to be detennined at least as much by the policyholder-demand considerations that
I describe in the next section as by the perfectibility standard. My point here is that
strict liability is typically rejected as the governing standard.
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of policyholder demand for the disputed coverage. Once the linguistic
standard of care to which the court subscribes is shown to have been
breached, the choice between these two approaches determines whether
the policyholder is granted relief - that is, whether the policy provi
sion in question is actually declared to be ambiguous.

1.

The Penalty Standard

Under what might be called a penalty standard,32 the degree of pol
icyholder demand for the coverage at issue is irrelevant to the ambigu
ity decision. Under a penalty standard the insured is entitled to the cov
erage afforded by a pro-coverage interpretation of the purportedly .
ambiguous policy provision, even if most policyholders would not want
to pay for such coverage if given the choice. The standard thus accom
plishes what its name suggests: it penalizes the insurer for including
ambiguous language in its policy.
A leading example of the use of a penalty standard is

Rusthoven v.

Commercial Stan dard Insurance Co.,33 in which the policy contained in
consistent policy provisions. Rusthoven was injured by an uninsured
motorist while driving a vehicle owned by his employer. The em
ployer's auto policy provided coverage of losses caused by uninsured
motorists, and the premium was based on the employer's gross receipts.
At the time of the accident there were

67 autos in the employer's fleet.

The declarations (cover page) of the policy listed the amount of unin
sured motorists coverage as

$25,000 per person. The policy provided

that
[r]egardless of the number of covered autos, insureds, claims made or ve
hicles involved in the accident, the most we will pay for all damages re
sulting from any one accident is the limit of UNINSURED MOTORISTS

INSURANCE shown in the declarations.34
Elsewhere, however, the policy provided that "If there is more than one

sum o f the
limits applicable to each covered auto."35 Rusthoven claimed coverage
equal to the sum of the per person limits of liability- $25,000 per per-

covered auto our limit of liability for any one accident is the

32. I have borrowed this term from default-rule theory in the contract-law litera
ture. The term seems to have been used first in Ian Ayers & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87,
91 (1989).
33. 387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1986).
34. 387 N.W.2d at 643.
35. 387 N.W.2d at 643 (emphasis added).
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son - applicable to each covered auto (of which there were 67), or
$1,675,000.36

It seems extremely unlikely that Rusthoven's employer, or Rus
thoven, had he been given the choice, would have chosen to pay premi
ums to secure this amount of uninsured motorists coverage. Nonethe
less, the court held that the policy language was ambiguous because it
contained inconsistent provisions, and awarded Rusthoven that amount
of coverage. 37 In traditional terms, the rationale for this approach is that
the insurer, as drafter of the policy, has control over its language and
should bear the consequences of failing to employ unambiguous lan
guage.38 As I noted earlier, however, invoking contra pro feren tem under
these circumstances amounts to the rejection of any requirement that
there have been reliance by the policyholder or that the ambiguous pro
vision have harmed the policyholder. Rather, under these circumstances
the insurer pays a penalty for the ambiguity without regard to the de
gree of demand for the coverage afforded by an interpretation based on

contra proferen tem.
A penalty standard affords the insurer three choices: (1) the insurer
may retain the provision as written, recognizing that it will face liability
under the penalty standard;

(2) the insurer may redraft the "offending"
provision to eliminate its ambiguity; or (3) in at least some jurisdictions

the insurer may attempt to remedy the ambiguity by dispelling policy
holders' expectations regarding the meaning of the provision - for ex
ample, by pointing out the limitations on coverage the insurer intends
the provision to effectuate. Recent contract-law literature suggests that
the function of a penalty approach in filling contractual gaps is to force
the party facing a potential penalty to reach an agreement on a substi
tute term with the other contracting party. 39 In the insurance setting,
however, where industrywide standard-form contracts predominate, the
first alternative is likely to be the cost-minimizing alternative until a
sufficient number of insurers have paid a sufficient number of penalties
to warrant investing in the cost of redrafting the policy provision in
question.

36. See 387 N.W.2d at 644.
37. See 387 N.W.2d at 644-45.
38. See STEMPEL, supra note 1, § 5.9, at 206-07; Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable
Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323, 327-28 (1986).
39. For discussion and extensive references, see generally Symposium on Default
Rules and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISCIPLINARY LJ. 1 (1993).
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The Majoritarian Sta'!-'1ard

An alternative approach imports a requirement that is rmssmg
under

the

penalty

standard.

This

approach

might

be

called

a

majoritarian standard,40 under which, for a purportedly ambiguous pol
icy provision to be interpreted in favor of coverage, the coverage must
be such that the majority of policyholders would prefer to purchase it at
an actuarially fair price. This standard is similar to the one that many
contract-law theorists have argued should guide the gap-filling function
of courts when they resolve disputes over matters that are not expressly
resolved by contract terms: choose the contract provision to which the
parties would have agreed had they negotiated over the issue in ques
tion.41 No doubt something like this standard often operates when there
is a gap in an insurance policy.42 My contention, however, is that often
the courts also implicitly take this approach in order to interpret express
but ambiguous policy provisions.
. One can glimpse occasional traces of this approach in the case law.
For example, the "full" expectations principle directs that the reasona

ble expectations of the insured be honored, notwithstanding even clear,
contrary policy language.43 Courts in some states, however, apply a lim
ited version of the expectations principle that applies only to the inter
pretation of ambiguous policy provisions.44 Though phrased as a sword

for the policyholder, this limited version actually is a shield for the in

surer, for under the rule, the reasonable expectations of the policyholder
limit the reach of contra proferentem. Under the rule, ambigilous policy

provisions may not be interpreted against the insurer if the resulting
coverage could not reasonably be expected.45
One view is that this formulation is merely a restatement of the

traditional rule that a policy provision is not ambiguous unless it is
"reasonably" susceptible to more than one interpretation. But I think

40. See Ayers & Gertner, supra note 32, at 93.
41. For discussion of this notion, see Ayers & Gertner, supra note 32, at 87-91.
For a similar argument in the insurance context, see Fischer, supra note 2, at 1001.
42. A prominent example is the body of rules that has developed the insurer's duty
to settle claims against its insured under a liability insurance policy. See Kent R.
Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113 (1990).
43. See KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 1, § 6.3(a)(4), at 636.
44. See Roger C.Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insur
ance Law After Two Decades, 51 Omo ST. LJ. 823, 835-36 & n.72 (1990).
45. See KEETON & Wm1ss, supra note 1, § 6.3(a)(2), at 628 n.4 ("It seems likely
that there has always been an implicit understanding that ambiguities, which in most
cases might be resolved in more than just one or the other of two ways, would be re
solved favorably to the insured's claim only if a reasonable person in the insured's posi
tion would have expected coverage.").
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that the formulation is more than a mere restatement of the traditional
rule. The articulated focus of the traditional rule tends to be the policy
language itself. When courts invoking the traditional rule speak of pol
icy language that is or is not reasonably susceptible to more than one
interpretation, typically they mean that the disputed policy provision it
self, usually standing alone, but at most in the light of the remaining
policy language, will reasonably bear the policyholder's interpretation.46

In contrast, the ambiguity decisions that invoke the expectations of the
policyholder as a limit on the reach of

contra proferentem often focus

on matters beyond the policy language, such as the typical businessper
son 's unfamiliarity with the distinction between legal and equitable
remedies,47 the insured's concern that the failure to make a prompt re
port that it had made a new acquisition would create a gap in its cover
age,48 and the expectations of a pesticide manufacturer that its products
liability insurance would not contain a coverage limitation for "pollu
tion" that would apply to injuries resulting from the normal use of its
product.49
This focus on considerations lying outside the policy language
comes close to the express adoption of a majoritarian standard. The re
striction on the scope of

contra proferentem embodied in the limited '

version of the reasonable expectations principle requires that policy
holders believe that they are already protected by the coverage they
claim the ambiguous policy provision affords them. If policyholders do
believe that they already have the coverage in question, then the premi
ums they pay insurers probably already reflect this supposition: when I

think I am buying an eight-cylinder car I naturally am willing to pay
more than I would for the identical model with six cylinders. Demand
thus affects price. The only distinction between this expectations
limited approach to

contra proferentem and the majoritarian standard as

I have defined it is that the former applies as long as policyholders ex
pect that they have the coverage in question, whereas the latter applies
only if, in addition, policyholders would be willing to pay an accurate
price for that coverage.

46. See Rusthoven v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 387 N.W.2d 642 (Minn.
1986).
47. See Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175,
181 (Minn. 1990).
48. See Cooper Cos. Inc. v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 2d 508, SIS
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
49. See Great Lakes Chem. Co. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 638 N.E.2d
847, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
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Most of the time, however, this is likely to be a distinction without
a difference. In most cases in which policyholders expect that they have
the coverage in question they probably also already are paying for it,
because of the interaction between demand and price. Admittedly, how
ever, there may be cases in which policyholders suppose they have the
coverage in question, the insurer supposes otherwise and has not
charged for it, and policyholders would not be willing to pay as much
as the insurer would have charged for providing that coverage if the in
surer knew that it would be required to do so. In this situation the lim
ited version of the expectations principle would require that contra
proferen tem be invoked, even though the majoritarian standard as I have
defined it would not be satisfied.
But the courts are only rarely in a position to find the facts that
would be necessary to distinguish between these two slightly different
approaches. To draw such a distinction, a court would have to be able
to determine whether the majority of policyholders does or does not
reasonably expect the coverage in question, whether these policyholders
are or are not already paying for the coverage they reasonably expect,
and whether these policyholders would or would not be willing to pay
an accurate price for that coverage if they knew that they had to ch9ose
whether to purchase it.
The courts make no such determinations. Interestingly, to the ex
tent that they even admit that these considerations are relevant, in prac
tice the courts treat them as questions of law. They address these con
siderations in an empirically casual manner or as a matter of logic, as if
somehow this treatment justifies dispensing with the factual predicates
of a finding regarding the coverage expectations of most policyholders.
The result is that the courts often simply assert that the policyholder's
proposed interpretation of a contested policy provision is reasonable,
that the provision is therefore ambiguous, and that contra proferen tem
applies. In contrast, when courts conclude that the majoritarian standard
has not been satisfied, they either invoke the expectations limit on .the
scope of contra proferen tem, or simply state that the disputed policy
provision is not ambiguous. In these cases the unarticulated majoritarian
standard, not the degree of linguistic clarity of the disputed provision,
decides the issue.

An insurer seeking to minimize costs under a majoritarian standard
is even less likely to redraft the provision than under a penalty standard,
because policyholders are likely to be paying for the coverage in ques-
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tion already.50 In this situation it obviously would not be in the insurer's
interest to redraft so as to eliminate coverage. Yet the insurer also
would have little to gain and something to lose by redrafting so as to
clarify that there is coverage of the kind at issue. This is because some
insureds will claim coverage under the existing provision, but some will
be misled by it and make no claims. In contrast, for the same premiums

the insurer would probably receive more claims under a redrafted and
clarified policy provision. Thus, although ambiguities in insurance poli

cies are likely to persist for some time when they provide coverage for
which the majority of policyholders would not be willing to pay an ac
tuarially fair premium, ambiguities will persist to an even greater extent
when the majoritarian standard is in fact satisfied.
ill.

THE APPROACHES COMBINED

The courts employ either of two linguistic standards of care and ei
ther of two policyholder-demand standards in assessing the ambiguity
of insurance policy provisions. It turns out, therefore, that there are four
possible conceptions of contra proferentem rather than merely one. The
four possibilities are reflected in the following matrix. Each cell repre
sents one of the different possible approaches to the interpretation of ar
guably ambiguous policy language.

Negligence
Majoritarian Standard

Negligence
Penalty Standard

Strict Liability
Majoritarian Standard

Strict Liability
Penalty Standard

In the following analysis I discuss each of these four approaches, build

ing from the most narrow to the most broad, and therefore leaving the
traditional conception of contra proferentem

-

the lower right cell -

until last. This strategy of presentation helps to explain most clearly the

50. An insurer faced with a judicial finding of ambiguity in a case in which the
majoritarian standard is satisfied - i.e., where policyholders already are likely to be
paying for the coverage in question - has the same three choices noted earlier: (1) re
tain the provision as written and risk future liability; (2) redraft; or (3) in some jurisdic
tions, remedy the ambiguity by dispelling policyholders' expectations regarding the
meaning of the provision.
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reason for unacknowledged departures from the traditional conception,
as well as the overall normative appeal of the traditional approach.
A.

Negligence Liability with a Majoritarian·Standard

This narrowest of the four approaches is expressly limited to the

situation in which contra proferentem has the most obvious normative
appeal. Here the policy provision whose meaning is disputed is perfect
ible, and the majority of policyholders would be willing to pay for the
coverage that would be provided by contra proferentem. Indeed, under
a number of circumstances there is a synergy between the two features
of this conception. On the one hand, policyholders may suppose that
they have the coverage in question, and as a consequence they may
have been paying premium rates that have already compensated the in
surer for that coverage. In this situation even the insurer that is unaware
of the potential ambiguity of the disputed policy provision cannot rea
sonably object to the application of contra proferentem because it has
been paid for the broader coverage afforded by the doctrine. Moreover,
at least sometimes the insurer will not be innocently unaware of the potential ambiguity. Rather, the insurer's argument that the policy provi
sion is not susceptible to two reasonable interpretations will be disin
genuous. On the other hand, if policyholders desire the coverage in

question and the insurer has not been charging for it, then invoking con

tra proferentem will be market enhancing, given that the insurer has

been missing the opportunity to sell coverage for which there is de
mand. In this latter situation one might even say that the insurer has
been negligent not only in drafting ambiguous policy language, but also
in failing to provide and charge for the coverage in question.
The majoritarian standard has normative appeal not only when the
majority of policyholders would wish to purchase the coverage that in

vocation of contra proferentem would provide, but also when they
would not. In rare cases a court may actually state that the policy provi
sion in question is linguistically ambiguous but that because the pro

posed interpretation would not accord with the objectively reasonable
expectations of the majority of policyholders, it will not be interpreted
in favor of coverage. For example, in the recent and much-discussed

decision of Owens-Illin ois, Inc. v. Unite d Insurance Co.,51 the Supreme

Court of New Jersey was �ked by a policyholder to impose joint and
several coverage responsibility on the policyholder's insurers over a pe
riod of years for the policyholder's asbestos-related liabilities on the

51. 650 A.2d 974 (NJ. 1994).

·
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ground that the policies were ambiguous as to the method of allocating
coverage responsibility among these "triggered" policies.52 The court

first posed the question, "Does the Language of the Policies Resolve

the Allocation Issue?" and next answered, "We are unable to find the

answer to allocation in the language of the policies," but then rejected

both the policyholder's and the insurer's proposed interpretations, in

stead fashioning what the court termed the most "efficient" approach.53

The court directed a special master to provide the coverage that, in ef
fect, policyholders would have selected had they been able to make the
choice. This degree of candor, however, is unusual.
B.

Strict Liability with a Majoritarian Stan dard

This approach has muFh the same normative appeal as the first, ex

cept that the policy language in question need not be reasonably per
fectible to invoke contra pro feren tem. Of course, it does not follow that

the language in question is not reasonably perfectible. This approach

simply does not require an inquiry into that issue. The difference be

tween this approach and the first, therefore, is that 1:1nder this approach,

contra proferen tem applies not only to policy prdvisions that are per

fectible, but also to those that are not. What can be gained by applying

contra pro feren tem to this additional increment of nonperfectible policy
provisions?

There are three arguments for including this increment within the

sweep of contra proferen tem. First, as I noted above, the move to strict

liability reduces litigation costs by making the perfectibility issue irrele

vant in coverage disputes. Second, the ambiguous policy language itself

- as distinguished from some independent expectation - may have

led some policyholders to assume that they were provided coverage by

the language in question and to rely to their detriment on that assump

tion. For example, had the policyholder known that the policy precluded

the coverage in question, the policyholder might have purchased the

coverage elsewhere if it had been available, or may have taken precau
tionary measures that could have avoided the loss for which it now

claims coverage. Finally, suppose that the vast majority of ambiguous

policy provisions are in fact perfectible, but that distinguishing those

that are perfectible from those that are not is an unreliable process. In

52. In the language of this field, a CGL insurance policy is "triggered" if bodily
injury or property damage falling within the terms of coverage occurred "during the
policy period." See KENNETH s. ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY INSUR·
ANCE LAW 91-102 (1991) [hereinafter ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY].
53. Owens-Illinois, 650 A.2d at 988-96.
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that case a rule that classified all such provisions as ambiguous could
produce a lower rate of error (i.e., the percentage of cases in which a
nonperfectible policy provision is held to be ambiguous) than the rate
of error under a negligence test itself (i.e., the percentage of cases in
which a perfectible policy provision is held not to be ambiguous). Even
assuming that the theoretically optimal linguistic standard is negligence
rather than strict liability, because of the risk of error in adjudicating the
negligence issue a strict liability standard may in this way generate
more accurate determinations than negligence.
Moreover, an approach that expressly adhered to strict liability, but
then silently departed from that standard in cases of very obvious
nonperfectibility, would produce an even lower rate of error, as judged
from the standpoint of the theoretically optimal negligence standard.
One might describe such cases

as involving a finding of non

perfectibility by judicial .11otice to distinguish them from cases that
would require evidence even to support a finding of nonperfectibility as
a matter of law.
C.

Negligence Liability with a Penalty Standard

This approach is the mirror image of strict liability with a
majoritarian standard. The approach captures all the cases in which a
policy provision is perfectible and the majority of policyholders would
purchase the coverage at issue, plus the increment of cases in which the
relevant policy provision is perfectible but the majority of policyholders
would not wish to purchase the coverage in question. Admittedly, on
the surface this approach lacks the appeal of the two that employ a
majoritarian standard because under this approach the policyholder
probably gets something for nothing. That is, when the majority of poli
cyholders would not purchase the coverage in question, it is unlikely
that market conditions have been permitting or would permit the insurer
to charge for this coverage even while ambiguously declining to pro
vide it.
Nonetheless, under this approach there is a synergy between the
linguistic and demand dimensions of contra proferen tem that gives it an
appeal that is lacking under strict liability with a majoritarian standard.
Here the insurer has employed a policy provision that is perfectible. For
this reason the insurer could have avoided liability simply ·by perfecting
the provision, and it can do so in the future. Application of contra
proferen tem therefore serves as a simple signal to the insurer that the
provision should be perfected, and ordinarily such application should be
unobjectionable unless redrafting costs are prohibitively high.

Michigan Law Review

554

[Vol. 95:531

This approach also can generate some of the same benefits as strict
liability with a majoritarian standard. The approach entails lower litiga
tion costs because it avoids the need to assess the degree of policy
holder demand for the relevant coverage. Because of the probable diffi
culty of making such assessments accurately, this approach also may
entail lower error costs, especially if in the vast majority of litigated
cases the majoritarian standard would be satisfied but it would be diffi
cult to prove this fact.
Finally, recall that under strict liability with a majoritarian standard
the courts might take "judicial notice" of the obvious nonperfectibility
of an ambiguous policy provision and thereby reduce the rate of error
under that approach. A corresponding move might be made under negli
gence liability with a penalty standard, by taking judicial notice of the
occasional obvious failure of a linguistically ambiguous policy provi
sion to satisfy the majoritarian standard, and declining to invoke con tra

proferen tem to interpret that provision. In this manner the rate of error
- as compared to negligence liability with a majoritarian standard could be reduced even further.
D.

Strict Liability with a Penalty Stan dard: The Traditional
Conception

The traditional conception of contra proferen tem goes further than
any of the other approaches standing alone, but no further than what the
other approaches could do in combination. The traditional conception
imposes coverage responsibility when the policy provision whose mean
ing is in dispute is perfectible and when the majority of policyholders
would have purchased the coverage in question. But under the tradi
tional conception of contra proferen tem an ambiguous policy provision
also results in coverage when the policy provision at issue could not
reasonably be perfected and when the majority of policyholders would
not have purchased the coverage in question. Consequently, the case for
the traditional conception must be that it combines the advantages of
the other three, narrower approaches to contra proferen tem. In doing so,
however, it also risks disadvantages. I discuss both below.
1.

A dvantages

The traditional conception has a number of advantages. The trans
action-cost case for the traditional conception is obvious: by dispensing
with the kinds of inquiries that would be necessary to satisfy the per
fectibility and majoritarian standards, the traditional conception makes
the ambiguity decision simple, straightforward, and inexpensive. By
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employing a strict liability standard the traditional conception also as
sures coverage in any case in which a policyholder has been misled by
ambiguous language and thereby suffered a loss that otherwise would
have been insured or avoided. Furthermore, the traditional conception
assures coverage to the minority of policyholders who have detrimen
tally relied on the policy provision in question, either because had they
known there was no coverage they would have purchased the coverage
in question elsewhere, or because they believed that in fact they did
purchase this coverage.
Moreover, the traditional conception has the potential to reduce the
costs of error in achieving the aims of the other approaches. To apply
the negligence and majoritarian standards accurately, a court would
often have to be presented with substantial amounts of information,
much of it difficult to obtain and difficult to sort through. If it is a fair
presumption that most linguistically imperfect policy provisions are rea
sonably perfectible, and that the majority of policyholders would be
willing to pay an accurate premium for the coverage that would be af
forded by a pro-coverage interpretation of the majority of such provi
sions, then the traditional conception will produce results that are a
close approximation of the ideal, without incurring the transaction and
other costs that accompany the alternatives to the traditional conception.
Finally, for the reasons noted earlier, insurers have incentives that
promote the persistence of ambiguous policy provisions even in the face
of contra proferen tem. The traditional conception imposes the risk of ir
remediable ambiguity on the enterprises that are most likely to be the
superior bearer of that risk - insurance companies, which are in the
business of risk bearing.

2.

Disadvq.ntages

The principal argument against the traditional conception is that it
is simplistic in its disregard of otherwise normatively relevant consider
ations. The question is whether this disadvantage is worth its advan
tages. For example, if most policy provisions that fail the "ordinary
reader" test are not reasonably perfectible, or if the majority of policy
holders do not wish to purchase the coverage afforded them by applying
the traditional conception, then error costs probably are higher under
the traditional conception than under the others.54 In addition, the pen
alty standard employed by the traditional conception may generate ei-

54. Whether the error costs generated by the traditional conception are higher
under these circumstances still depends, however, on the error rate associated with each
of the other approaches. The traditional conception may still be superior on this score,
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tiler of two otller undesirable results. On tile one hand, all policyholders
may receive tile coverage resulting from tile penalty standard and be
charged accordingly, even tllough tile majority may not desire this cov
erage. Unless tile majority is itself mistaken in supposing tllat tile cover
age in question is not worfu purchasing at an accurate price, tllis conse
quence is undesirable. On tile otller hand, at otller times demand for
coverage generally may be sufficiently elastic and tile cost of tile judi
cially added coverage sufficiently high tllat insurers find it preferable because policyholders find it preferable - to circumvent tile issue en
tirely by removing tile offending policy provision from tile policy alto
getller, tllereby declining to provide not only tile judicially added cover
age, but tile narrower coverage tllat insurers had intended to provide
and tllat tile majority of policyholders had wished to purchase.
Under this scenario contra proferentem ultimately results in tile
availability of less coverage tll an would have been afforded in its ab
sence.ss Expressed in more vernacular terms, tile paradox is tllat for pol
icyholders who wish to purchase half a loaf of coverage for half a pre
mium, tile threat posed by tile traditional conception may result in
insureds being offered eitller a full loaf of coverage for a full premium,
or no loaf at all.s6

even when the vast majority of disputed provisions are not perfectible or desired by
most policyholders, if the other approaches also are very inaccurate.
55. I once argued that this is precisely what occurred in connection with the so
called qualified pollution exclusion in CGL insurance policies written between about
1970 and 1985. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of In
surance, 88 CoLUM. L. REv. 942, 961-66 (1988). That exclusion contained an excep
tion for discharges of pollutants that were "sudden and accidental." Some courts held
this phrase to be ambiguous and (under the traditional conception) therefore interpreted
it to cover unexpected, gradual discharges. I argued that these interpretations resulted in
the insurance industry's revision of the standard-form policy to remove virtually all pol
lution coverage from all CGL policies written beginning in 1986. In effect, insurers
seem to have concluded that if they could not rely on policy provisions that they be
lieved limited coverage to liability for short-term, abrupt pollution, they would not in
sure against pollution liability at all. I implied that the judicial decisions holding the
"sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion to be ambiguous were in
correctly decided. In retrospect, I continue to think that I accurately described the atti
tude and motives of the insurance industry, but I have since concluded that the proper
interpretation of the pre-1986 pollution exclusion is a more complicated question than I
thought at the time. This view is based in part on the representations that the insurance
industry made to state insurance commissioners when it sought approval of the exclu
sion in the early 1970s. For discussion of the timing and nature of these representations,
see ABRAHAM, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY, supra note 52, at 145-60.
56. Cf. Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why In
surance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REv. 171,
237 (1995).
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Assessment

In theory the courts could select any of the four alternative ap
proaches to contra proferentem. In my view, however, the key issue is
which of the two polar approaches should prevail: (1) the approach that
has the most obvious normative appeal - negligence with a
majoritarian standard, or (2) the traditional conception - strict liability
with a penalty standard. This is the key choice because either of the two
intermediate approaches can only be superior if the advantages of the
linguistic and demand dimensions typically are not congruent. For ex
ample, negligence liability with a penalty standard could be superior to
the other approaches only if the transaction and error costs of the negli
gence standard were tolerable. Similarly, strict liability with a
majoritarian standard could be superior to the other approaches only if
the transaction and error costs of the majoritarian standard were tolera
ble. Neither of these states of affairs seems likely because the transac
tion and error costs of the negligence and majoritarian standards, re
spectively, normally will be high.
Consequently, the issue is which polar alternative the courts should
choose. They could reject the traditional conception as overbroad and
instead inquire expressly and openly, on a case-by-case basis, into the
perfectibility and degree of demand for coverage under policy provi
sions that do not satisfy the ordinary-reader test. In the alternative, they
could adhere to the traditional conception and tolerate its occasional ex
cesses. I believe that the problems of evidentiary manageability that
would arise under any of the alternatives to the traditional conception
probably are not worth the potential gain that would result from em
ploying them. Nonetheless, in Part V below I analyze these problems
and suggest some devices that the courts could adopt to attempt to re
solve them.
In the end I think that the courts themselves have recognized that
if an overt choice must be made between the traditional conception and
any of the alternatives, then the traditional conception is superior. That
is why the courts almost always formally adhere to the traditional con
ception, even when they silently depart from it. But having made that
formal choice, some courts then have tried to have it both ways, ordina
rily adhering to the traditional conception in both form and substance,
while making exceptions to it when they can take what amounts to "ju
dicial notice" that the policy provision in dispute is not reasonably per
fectible, or that providing the coverage at issue would violate the
majoritarian standard. In taking this approach the courts have avoided
the evidentiary and other difficulties they would encounter in applying
the negligence and majoritarian standards across the board. Otherwise,
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the traditional conception prevails. This approach may produce substan
tively optimal results, but it also generates confusion about what the
courts really are doing in this field.

IV.

RIGHTS AT VARIANCE WITH POLICY PROVISIONS
"

The portrait I have sketched cannot be complete without consider
ing the relation between contra proferentem and certain other doctrines
that also affect the meaning of insurance policy provisions. Professor
(now Judge) Robert Keeton's famous identification of this category of
doctrines creating "rights at variance" with policy provisions57 distin
guishes in effect between the interpretation of insurance policy lan
guage and the application of legal doctrines to that policy language. In
Keeton's view such doctrines as the expectations principle, waiver, es
toppel, and others act upon the policy language and render that lan
guage inapplicable or more limited than it would be if it were merely
interpreted.58 I want to suggest that the development of these rights at
variance with policy provisions can be explained at least in part, if not
entirely, by the difficulties that courts face in the interpretive arena.
The core of the problem arises in cases in which the policy provi
sion in question could not reasonably have been perfected, but the ma
jority of policyholders would want and would be willing to pay for the
coverage that would be afforded by a finding that the relevant provision
is ambiguous. In such cases, the absence of the coverage claimed by the
policyholder is likely to trouble courts because most policyholders
probably believe that they already have this coverage, and in any event
they would be willing to pay an accurate price for it. For a court that
adheres to the traditional conception of contra proferentem

-

which

applies strict liability and makes the question of perfectibility irrelevant
- the result is easy: the provision in question is ambiguous.
In contrast, for any court that has formally adhered to contra

proferentem but in fact has employed a negligence standard, the choice
is not so easy. One option is to invoke contra proferentem and hold the
policy provision ambiguous. This option, however, requires rejecting
57. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy Provi
sions (pt 1), 83 HAR.v. L. REv. 961 , 961-63 (1970); see also KEETON & W101ss,
supra note 1, § 6.l(a), at 614-16.
58. See KEETON & W101ss supra note 1, § 6.l(a), at 615 (stating that these doc
trines represent "concepts that have continued to become increasingly significant in the
••

resolution of insurance disputes involving claimants who seek to assert rights which are
not in accord with the provisions of the applicable insurance contract"). Although the
validity of this kind of distinction between mere interpretation and the giving of legal
effect to policy language is open to question, I believe that my analysis does not depend
on whether such a distinction is valid.
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the court's own private conception of what contra proferentem is really

all about. The second option for such a court is to hold that the policy
provision is not ambiguous and, as a result, take its own medicine. The
former option conflicts with the court's actual jurisprudence, yet the lat
ter option leaves policyholders without coverage that the court believes
they want and ought to have. Neither option is very attractive.
For such a court a more attractive alternative is to develop a doc
trinal basis for finding that there is coverage, notwithstanding the "un
ambiguous" policy language. Traditionally this aim was achieved when it could be achieved - through doctrines such as waiver and es
toppel, which focus on specific factual interactions between particular
policyholders and their insurers.59 The legal significance of these inter
actions is that they trump policy language, but typically only in the par
ticular context in which the individual policyholder-plaintiff finds him
self. For traditional courts this limited kind of effect was probably all
that seemed appropriate. As judicial lawmaking became more accept
able over time, however, the c.ases in which there was no viable claim
of ambiguity, waiver, or estoppel, but in which the majority of policy
holders expected that they were covered, gave rise to a tension that
eventually was resolved by the expectations prinCiple.
The key to understanding the role played by the expectations prin
ciple, I think, lies in its assurance that the objectively reasonable expec
tations of the policyholder as to coverage will be honored, notwith
standing

contrary

policy

language.60

The

requirement

that

the

expectations be objectively reasonable is significant not simply because
it rejects a subjective test, but because objectively reasonable expecta
tions are those that are likely to be held by the majority of policyhold
ers. Thus, the expectations principle does for policyholders as a group
what waiver and estoppel did for the individual policyholder-plaintiff: it
affords them coverage under policy provisions that are reasonably clear
under the circumstances, but not sufficiently clear, or at least not suffi
ciently obvious, to definitively communicate their meaning to the ordi
nary policyholder.
Of course, clarity for the ordinary policyholder depends not only
on the words chosen to limit coverage, but also on the placement of
those words within the policy. It is no surprise, then, that expectations
principle cases tend to involve "fine print" exclusions, and that the
courts invoking the expectations principle sometimes comment that the
policyholder's expectation of coverage could be dispelled by pointing

59. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 1 , § 6.l(b), at 617-18.
60. See Henderson, supra note 44, at 825.

560

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 95:531

out the offending provision or by highlighting it within the policy.61 The
considerable uncertainty exhibited in the case law and commentary on
this point,62 however, reflects yet another tension, which the expecta
tions principle itself creates. Developed as an aid to the majority of pol
icyholders, the expectations principle - softened by courts that permit
dispelling individual expectations - may end up retaining the individu

alized focus of the doctrines of waiver and estoppel that the principle is
supposed to supplant. Designed to remedy a problem arising out of the
use of standardized policy language, the principle thus becomes un-

61. See, e.g., Gordinier v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 285 (Ariz.
1987) (stating that "[t]he possibility remains that these [exclusions] limitations were
called to [the insured's] attention" and that "[i]f Aetna can prove this, we will enforce
the limitation of coverage"); State Farm Mut Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bogart, 717 P.2d 449,
457 (Ariz. 1986) (en bane) ("Such an eventuality is certainly one that should be clearly
called to the attention of the insured."); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 174
(Cal. 1966) (en bane) (limitation on duty to defend would defeat the insured's reasona
ble expectations because the limitation "is not 'conspicuous' since it appears only after
a long and complicated page of fine print, and is itself in fine print"); C & J Fertilizer,
Inc. v. Allied Mut Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Iowa 1975) (substance of an exclu
sion was not explained to plaintiff); Simon v. Continental Ins. Co., 724 S.W.2d 210,
212-13 (Ky. 1986) (automobile policy's underinsured motorist limits, buried in a
lengthy definitions section, defeated the reasonable expectations of the insured absent a
clear and conspicuous manifestation of excluded coverage); DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs.
Ins. Co., 398 A.2d 1274, 1280 (NJ. 1979) (automobile policy coverage provisions and
definitions regarding nonowned automobiles were placed clearly and conspicuously on
the first page, and thus the insured could have no objectively reasonable expectation of
the coverage sought); Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 328, 333 (N.J. 1966)
("If the company had acted fairly in the effort to exclude coverage . . . it would have
given the insured clear notice to that effect on the face page . . . or by a slip attached to
the face page . . . . "); Lehrhoff v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 638 A.2d 889, 892 (N.J.
Super. Ct App. Div. 1994) ("[R]easonable expectations of coverage raised by the decla
ration page cannot be contradicted by the policy's boilerplate unless the declaration
page itself clearly so warns the insured."); Hionis v. Northern Mut. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d
363, 365 (Pa Super. Ct 1974) ("Even where a policy is written in unambiguous terms,
the burden of establishing the applicability of an exclusion or limitation involves proof
that the insured was aware of the exclusion or limitation and that the effect thereof was
explained to him.").
62. For example, some courts have held that an insured's reasonable expectations
survive coverage limitations despite the insured's apparent knowledge of the limitations.
See, e.g., Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 433, 441-42 (Cal. 1975) (en bane)
(when reasonable expectation of coverage was created by the insurer's acceptance of a
premium with the application for coverage, if the insurer wishes to counter the expecta
tion "it must not only use clear and unequivocal language evidencing its intent to limit
temporary coverage . . . [and] call such limiting condition to the attention of the appli
cant," but must also return the tendered premium); Sparks v. St Paul Ins. Co., 495 A.2d
406, 414-15 (NJ. 1985) (in most insurance contracts "consent can be inferred only to
the extent that the policy language conforms to public expectations and commercially
reasonable standards"; absent "proof of factual circumstances that would render such
limited . . . coverage both reasonable and expected," the policy limitation did not sat
isfy the objectively reasonable expectations of the purchaser).
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available to policyholders who have been made individually aware of

otherwise unexpected policy provisions. The effect of this approach is

to destandardize policy language by affording coverage to the majority

while denying it to the exceptional policyholder whose expectation has
been specifically dispelled.

This distinction between approaches that do and do not permit

proof that the policyholder's expectations were dispelled involves much
more than the creation of an occasional exception to the expectations

principle. The distinction reflects the difference between the tort and
contract views of the normative basis of contra proferentem that I iden

tified earlier. In tort-law terms, if the expectations principle applies only
when the policyholder subjectively expected coverage, then the princi

ple includes something like a requirement that the policyholder be

harmed by a coverage-limiting policy provision. This requirement is
closely analogous to the tort-law requirement that the defendant's

wrong be a cause of the plaintiff's injury. On the other hand, in con
tract-law terms, when the subjective expectation of the policyholder
claiming coverage is irrelevant, because the only requirement is that the

objectively reasonable expectations of the majority of policyholders be

honored, something like expectation damages are awarded. As in the
typical case of contract breach, proof of reliance is not required, be

cause the particular policyholder's lack of reliance - that is to say lack
of expectation of coverage - is irrelevant.

The distinction between approaches that do and do not permit the

dispelling of individual. expectations also replicates the choice between

negligence and strict liability under contra proferentem, which I sug

gested actually prompted development of the expectations principle in

the first place.63 Ordinarily an expectation of coverage either can be

cost-effectively dispelled across the board, or it cannot. The problem is

much like providing an effective warning to accompany a consumer
product. A fine-print exclusion can be highlighted,64 or selling agents
can be directed to point it out,65 or the marketing strategy that creates

the expectation can be modified,66 or else none of these expectation-

63. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
,64. See, e.g., Gerhardt, 225 A.2d at 333; Lehrhoff, 638 A.2d at 892.
65. See, e.g., Gordinier, 742 P.2d at 285; C & J Fertilizer, 227 N.W.2d at 177 (re
jecting defendant's assertion that contra proferentem does not apply because plaintiff
knew the policy contained the provision, and observing that the "escape clause . . . was
never read to or by plaintiff's personnel, nor was the substance explained by defend
ant's agent").
66. See, e.g., Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York, 377 P.2d 284, 288,
293-94 (Cal. 1962) (en bane) (holding that when airline trip insurance policy was mar
keted through a vending machine close to the time of departure, required the insured to
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dispelling measures can be taken. When taking one of these or a similar
measure is feasible and cost-effective, then a holding that a policyholder
had an objectively reasonable expectation of coverage is, in effect, a
holding that the insurer has been negligent in failing to dispel policy
holder expectations generally.67 In expectations principle cases an ap
proach that makes any particular policyholder's expectations relevant
therefore employs what amounts to a negligence standard governing the
insurer's marketing behavior.68

In contrast, an approach that makes any particular policyholder's
expectations irrelevant and directs attention to the expectations of poli
cyholders generally employs what amounts to strict liability. If the ma
jority of policyholders reasonably expect the coverage in question, then
regardless of whether the insurer has dispelled the expectations of the
policyholder-plaintiff, apparently it is not cost-effective to dispel expec
tations generally. If the insurer is nonetheless liable for the consequence
of its marketing behavior, logically this is strict liability for marketing
behavior.
When this strict liability feature of the expectations principle is
combined with the contract approach that makes any particular policy
holder's expectation irrelevant, the result is strict liability for failure to
provide coverage that the majority of policyholders reasonably expects.
This strong version of the expectations principle in effect imposes lia
bility on insurers for the breach of an implied promise to provide ex
pected coverage. Ironically, then, the judicial reluctance to accept the
strict liability feature of the traditional conception of contra proferentem
has given way to a willingness to disregard unambiguous policy lan
guage in the service of majoritarian expectations. What began at least in
part as a response to an interpretive bind has thus been transformed into
judicial prescription of the contents of insurance policies.

mail the policy to the beneficiary prior to departure, and did not provide a duplicate
copy, the insured had a reasonable expectation that substituted emergency transportation
would be covered absent a clear manifestation of the limitation to the purchaser).
67. Occasional exceptions to this generalization include cases involving particular
acts of negligence, such as an agent who fails to follow a directive that an unexpected
exclusion be pointed out.
68. It is not necessarily inconsistent for a court that has implicitly held a policy
provision to be sufficiently clear under all relevant circumstances - i.e., nonnegligently
drafted
to also hold that the insurer's marketing behavior is nonetheless negligent.
Under some circumstances the optimal approach to communicating the policy's mean
ing may well be to leave the policy language as it stands but to clarify its meaning by
some extracontractual method of explanation.
-
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THE PROBLEMS OF EVIDENTIARY MANAGEABILITY OUTSIDE
THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPTION

It may have been possible until now for courts to camouflage, or
even fail to recognize, their own departures from the traditional concep
tion of contra proferentem. Once these departures are identified, how
ever, the appropriate course of action is either to return to the traditional
conception or openly to embrace a new approach. I think that the diffi
culties inherent in expressly departing from the traditional conception of

contra proferentem are not worth the advantages of doing so. It is at

least plausible to suppose that the traditional conception entails lower
error and transaction costs than any of the alternatives. The traditional
conception certainly affords greater predictability.
But if courts are going to depart from the traditional conception by
engaging in the decisionmaking process I have described, then both jus
tice and common sense demand that they be more candid about what
they are doing. Greater candor will take some of the mystery out of the
interpretive process and enable the parties to direct their arguments to
the factors that actually influence the courts. However, the very consid
erations that have led the courts to be less than candid about these fac
tors suggest that greater candor alone will not necessarily improve the
process. Rather, modified rules that deal with the problems of eviden
tiary manageability and recognize the limits of judicial competence will
be needed.
1\vo major uncertainties have probably contributed to the fiction

that contra proferentem always involves strict liability and a penalty
standard. First, while courts may feel some confidence in their ability to
know a poorly drafted policy provision when they see it, they are also

likely to recognize that they may be unaware of considerations relevant
to the way in which the provision was drafted. For courts to acknowl
edge that they are employing a negligence standard therefore either
would make them vulnerable to criticism for acting without sufficient
evidence to support their decisions, or would subject them to mogntains
of evidence that would transform simple legal issues into complex ques
tions of fact. Second, whereas a penalty standard asks nothing of the
courts,

an

explicit majoritarian

standard would . pose

evidentiary

problems very similar to those that would be posed by employing a
negligence standard. As citizens themselves, judges may think that they
can reliably intuit the coverage expectations of the majority of policy
holders, but they are also likely to recognize that intuition is no substi
tute for evidence regarding a question of fact, especially if the question
is posed to a jury.
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Departing from the traditional conception only when a policy pro
vision self-evidently seems not to be perfectible or the coverage in
question clearly would not be purchased by the majority of policyhold
ers is a reaction to these uncertainties. But this de facto requirement that
departures from the traditional conception take place only when it can
be concluded virtually by "judicial notice" that the unstated standard
has not been breached is only a partial solution. This approach avoids
the need for factfinding by juries, but it does nothing to enable litigants
themselves to address the relevant issues, even if the issues are to be
decided by the court without traditional factfinding. If there are to be le
gitimate, limited departures from the traditional conception, then there
will have to be at least some effort to allow litigants to address relevant
issues.
A.

The Linguistic Standard of Care

The key here would be to permit the parties to address the perfect
ibility of the policy language whose meaning is in question without
opening the door to virtually unlimited amounts of evidence about that
question. The best way to do this would be through a hindsight perfect
ibility standard, which would make the decisionmaking process more
visible without radically changing its current character. Under a hind
sight standard the policyholder could demonstrate the ambiguity of the
policy provision in question not merely by showing that the provision is
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning, but also by identify
ing alternative language that would have been more suitable to achieve
the insurer's aim, given the insurer's contention that the policyholder's

claim is not covered. No other evidence directed at the question
whether the relevant policy language is reasonably perfectible, however,
would be admitted.
Under this approach the ambiguity decision would remain a ques
tion for the court, not a question of fact for the jury. By avoiding the
foresight issue, the approach would not degenerate into an evidentiary
inquiry into the considerations that might have been relevant to the ac
ceptability of the alternative language prepared by the policyholder. The
focus would still be on the language of the policy provision in question,
not on the quality of the drafter's conduct or on the factors that affected
the drafter's choice of language. As a consequence, the proposed
change would only minimally disrupt trial-level litigation, if at all. The
ambiguity inquiry would be pursued, much as it is now, on motion for
partial summary judgment or motion in limine, and appellate courts
therefore could continue to scrutinize the ambiguity decisions of lower
courts.
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Whether this approach would be both workable and superior to the
de facto, unacknowledged departures from contra proferentem that now
occur is uncertain. For example, insurers might argue that the approach
unfairly favors policyholders, by permitting the policyholder to identify
alternative, apparently more suitable policy language, without permit
ting the insurer to refute the contention that the policyholder's proposed
alternative language would have been more suitable than the actual pol
icy language.
Although it is true that insurers would in a sense be placed at this
disadvantage, they probably would be no more disadvantaged under this
approach than they are when the traditional conception is in force. In
surers would not be precluded from criticizing the alternative policy
language identified by the policyholder. . The approach would make evi

dentiary criticism of the policyholder's proposed alternative language
inadmissible, but would not rule out what might be termed argumenta
tive criticism. Neither the policyholder nor the insurer would be permit
ted to offer evidence, based on fact or on expert opinion, going to the
·

suitability of the policy language actually used by the insurer or offered
as an alternative by the policyholder. But just as the policyholder could
offer alternative language, so the insurer could criticize it, logically or
linguistically, for unsuitability. Just as the parties now argue, often with
out resort to any evidence at all, about whether disputed policy lan
guage is ambiguous, under the new standard they would be permitted to
argue about the strengths and weaknesses of the policyholder's pro
posed alternative language as compared to the actual policy language.

Thus, the insurer would be permitted to argue that the proposed al

ternative was even more ambiguous than the language actually con
tained in the policy, or that the language would not mesh with - or ac

tually would contradict - other language in the policy. Arguments that
stayed within the four comers of the insurance policy and the policy
holder's proposed alternative would be permitted. From the insurer's
standpoint this approach would at the least be no worse than the current
state of affairs. Even at present presumably the policyholder should be
permitted to offer aJ,ternative policy language in order to demonstrate,
albeit indirectly, the linguistic ambiguity of a policy provision. The dif
ference is that under the new standard such alternative language would
help to demonstrate not simply that the actual policy language is sus
ceptible to more than one meaning, but also that the alternative provi
sion offered is more suitable. The operative standard of judgment there
fore would be candidly acknowledged.
Although the hypothesized approach probably would be a second
best solution, it is impossible to know whether policyholders or insurers
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as a group would gain greater benefit from the approach. On the one
hand, insurers might gain if courts more consciously employed a negli
gence rather than a strict liability standard. On the other hand, certain
policyholders who would fail today in their efforts to invoke contra

proferentem might gain from the opportunity to address their arguments
expressly to the negligence standard actually employed by the courts,
and as a consequence might find themselves prevailing in cases that
previously they would have lost.
B.

The Demand Dimension

A penalty standard of course poses no evidentiary difficulties for
the courts, because when such a standard is in force, a finding for the
policyholder follows automatically from a finding of linguistic ambigu
ity, however defined. In contrast, a majoritarian standard requires infor
mation about the coverage. preferences of policyholders before a result
can be reached. Notwithstanding the greater normative appeal of a
majoritarian standard, however, it would be extremely undesirable to re
quire or even permit an ordinary interpretive dispute to be encumbered
by evidence from experts, market surveys, and the like, regarding poli
cyholder coverage preferences.
Moreover, the difficulty here is not simply the amount of evidence
that would encumber interpretive disputes, but how factfinding could
ever proceed effectiv¥1Y once that evidence were admitted. Other things
being equal, all policyholders prefer broader to narrower coverage. The
crux of a majoritarian standard cannot be simply to discern policyhold
ers' coverage preferences without more. Rather, the elasticity of de
mand for the coverage in question - what policyholders would be will
ing to pay - is the core question. Assessing the degree of this demand
for a particular form of coverage, however, is likely to be extremely
difficult. More important, assessing demand and attempting to satisfy it
is precisely what markets, including insurance markets, are adept at
doing.
Consequently, courts inclined to apply a majoritarian standard
would do this best not by seeking data about policyholder preferences,
but by requiring evidence of a market failure that the judicial prescrip
tion of coverage could solve. Evidence of such market failure would
consist, for example, of a misleading impression regarding the scope of
coverage conveyed by the arguably ambiguous policy provision.69 If

69. If the insurance market has declined (albeit ambiguously) to provide a particu
lar form of coverage, then one of three possibilities obtains: the majority of policyhold
ers would not in fact want the coverage at an accurate price; the market has failed to
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policyholders believe they are already covered against the loss at issue,

then they are likely already to be paying for such coverage. Not every
ambiguous policy provision falls in this category, however. Only provi

sions with which the mass of policyholders is likely to have some gen

eral familiarity will qualify. Misleading impressions are not created by

policy provisions that policyholders do not read or know anything
about. Similarly, not all market failures are judicially correctable. Under

a majoritarian standard, the insurer would have to be permitted to argue

that the threat of adverse selection or moral hazard explains its putative

coverage limitation, and that absent the limitation these phenomena
would so raise the cost of coverage that the majority of policyholders

would prefer a policy that includes the disputed coverage limitation,
sold at the current, lower premium. Permitting the insurer such a de

fense, however, would exponentially raise the level of complexity of the

typical dispute over policy interpretation.

In short, the evidentiary problems of employing a majoritarian

standard might be partially solved by looking first to the potentially

misleading character of arguably ambiguous policy provisions, and by

recognizing that in the absence of misleading provisions, the insurance

market may well already be satisfying the coverage preferences of the

majority of policyhold�rs. But to perform even this seemingly contained
task accurately could pose a very serious challenge for the courts.
CONCLUSION

My analysis has attempted to generate both descriptive and norma

tive insights. As a descriptive matter, the recognition that contra profer

entem is not one doctrine, but four different possibilities, should help to

explain the outcome of disputes over the meaning of arguably ambigu
ous policy language that previously have been difficult to understand.
Decisions that invoke contra proferentem even when the relevant policy

language seems optimally clear and most policyholders would not ex

pect the coverage at issue are applying the strict liability and penalty
standards that characterize the traditional conception. On the other

hand, decisions that hold policy language to be unambiguous even

when that language appears to be susceptible to more than one reasona

ble interpretation, or that decline to adopt the policyholder's proposed
interpretation of a policy provision that the court acknowledges to be
ambiguous, constitute rejections of the traditional conception. These lat-

take advantage of an available gain from trading expanded coverage for higher premi
ums; or policyholders have inaccurately assumed that the ambiguous policy provision is
already providing them with the coverage in question.
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ter decisions employ a negligence standard to assess the linguistic qual
ity of the disputed policy provision, or they apply the majoritarian de
mand standard to determine whether an admittedly ambiguous policy
provision should be construed in favor of coverage, or they do both.
Litigants and insurance-law scholars alike would do well to recog
nize, therefore, that the version of contra proferentem that is in force in
. any particular dispute has a significant effect on the kinds of arguments
that will appeal to the court and on the outcome of the dispute. Courts
employing the traditional conception are unlikely to be influenced by
insurers' efforts to demonstrate that a policy provision that is ambigu
ous is nonetheless optimally clear. Similarly, such courts are unlikely to
be influenced by the argument that few policyholders would wish to
purchase the coverage that would be afforded by construing an arguably
ambiguous provision in the policyholder's favor. On the other hand,
precisely these kinds of arguments are likely to influence courts that are
inclined to depart from the traditional conception.

As a normative matter, the great advantage of the traditional con
ception of contra proferentem is that it does not ask more of the courts
than they are able to deliver. Each of the three alternatives to the tradi
tional conception of contra proferentem as strict liability with a penalty
standard involves a more complex and more demanding process of judi
cial decision. Yet each of these alternatives also promises more precise
achievement of the value at the core of contra proferentem

-

assuring

that poorly drafted policy provisions do not deny policyholders the cov
erage they wish to purchase. The classic choice must therefore be made
between a reasonably effective but overbroad rule (the traditional· con
ception) and an approach (one of the three alternatives) that has the po
tential to achieve more perfect justice but only with higher transaction
costs and potentially adverse side effects.
Moreover, one of the apparent side effects of the courts' reluctance
to live with this choice has been the development of a strong version of
the expectations principle that has led the courts to venture over the
sometimes debatable line between interpretation of insurance policy lan
guage and regulation of the contents of insurance policies. A weak ver
sion of contra proferentem may thus lead to stronger versions of the ex
pectations principle, whereas the traditional conception of contra
proferentem may more typically be allied with a weaker version of the
expectations principle that produces less judge-made insurance.

On balance I prefer the traditional conception of contra profer

entem and a weaker version of the expectations principle. This combi
nation leaves the courts to do more of what they are comparatively ca
pable of doing - interpret - and less of what they tend to do poorly
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- regulate. While candor about the developments that have resulted in
departures from the traditional conception is desirable if such departures
are to continue, a full airing of the complicated and difficult considera
tions that these departures generate suggests that adherence - or for
some courts, return - to the traditional conception is likely to be the
most advisable course of action.

